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   Abstract 
For years, discussions of digital preservation have routinely featured comments such as “bit 
preservation is a solved problem; the real issues are … ”. Indeed, current digital storage 
technologies are not just astoundingly cheap and capacious, they are astonishingly reliable. 
Unfortunately, these attributes drive a kind of “Parkinson’s Law” of storage, in which demands 
continually push beyond the capabilities of systems implementable at an affordable price. This 
paper is in four parts: 
 
Claims, reviewing a typical claim of storage system reliability, showing that it provides no 
useful information for bit preservation purposes. 
 
Theory, proposing “bit half-life” as an initial, if inadequate, measure of bit preservation 
performance, expressing bit preservation requirements in terms of it, and showing that the 
requirements being placed on bit preservation systems are so onerous that the experiments 
required to prove that a solution exists are not feasible. 
 
Practice, reviewing recent research into how well actual storage systems preserve bits, 
showing that they fail to meet the requirements by many orders of magnitude. 
 
Policy, suggesting ways of dealing with this unfortunate situation.1 
 
 
                                                          
1 This article is based on the paper given by the author at iPRES 2008; received April 2009, published 
June 2010. 
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Introduction 
For years, discussions of digital preservation have routinely featured comments 
such as “bit preservation is a solved problem; the real issues are ...”.2 Indeed, current 
digital storage technologies are not merely astoundingly cheap and capacious, they are 
astonishingly reliable. Unfortunately, these attributes drive a kind of “Parkinson’s 
Law” (Parkinson, 1957) of storage, in which demands continually push beyond the 
capabilities of systems implementable at an affordable price. 
 
This paper is in four parts. The first part examines a typical claim made by a 
storage system vendor for the reliability of their product. It concludes that these 
numbers provide no useful information for bit preservation purposes. 
 
The second, theoretical, part asks what characterizes a solution to the bit 
preservation problem adequate to the large numbers of bits to be stored and the long 
durations for which these bits are to be preserved. It proposes “bit half-life” as a metric 
for bit preservation, discusses the requirements being placed upon preservation 
systems in terms of this metric, and investigates the feasibility of benchmarking 
systems to see if they meet these requirements. It concludes firstly that the 
requirements are so onerous that it is not feasible to measure whether systems meet 
them, and secondly that bit half-life is an inadequate metric. 
 
The third, practical, part reviews recent investigations into the performance of 
large-scale storage systems and their components. These studies uniformly report that 
storage reliability actually delivered to applications such as digital preservation 
systems is much less than that claimed by the manufacturers of systems and 
components. Tracking these failures to their root causes shows that every single 
hardware and software component contributes to some extent to the failures the 
systems experience. It concludes that current storage technologies fall well short of 
current requirements for bit preservation. 
 
Given that the actual performance of storage systems is much worse than 
required, and that even if it improves we still won’t be sure that a system will meet its 
requirements, the fourth part asks what is to be done. As with paper, content in digital 
archives will inevitably suffer loss and damage. The question is how to invest the 
limited funds available for preservation to the best effect in terms of improved data 
survival. There are many ways in which spending more money can reduce (but never 
completely eliminate) the probability of loss and damage. What is needed to allow 
informed investment decisions? How can we encourage the development of cost-
effective techniques for long-term bit preservation? 
Clarification 
It is incumbent on those attacking ideas such as the “solvedness” of bit 
preservation to focus on the strongest version of the idea3. If proponents really 
believed that bit preservation was solved, they wouldn’t bother with backups. Of 
                                                          
2 The prevalence of this meme is aptly illustrated by the letter from the iPres programme committee 
accepting this paper. It cites the title as “Bit Preservation - A Problem Solved”. 
3 “we should always try to clarify and to strengthen our opponent’s position as much as possible before 
criticising him” (Popper, 1959). 
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course, they do. What they really mean by bit preservation being solved is that the set 
of techniques in common use make it so unlikely that bits will be lost that there is no 
need for concern at the prospect. 
 
The techniques in which they place such faith are backups and checksums. Their 
real belief is that if they make a few backup copies of their content, and include in 
them checksums which they occasionally verify, their content will be safe. The goal of 
this paper is to show that, while backups and checksums may be adequate for 
relatively short periods and small amounts of preserved data, the scale and duration of 
current preservation tasks render them inadequate. 
 
The state of our knowledge about preserving bits can be summarized as: 
• The more copies the safer. As the size of the data increases, the per-copy 
cost increases, reducing the number of backup copies that can be afforded. 
• The more independent the copies the safer. As the size of the data 
increases, there are fewer storage options available. Thus the number of 
copies in the same storage technology increases, decreasing the average 
level of independence. 
• The more frequently the copies are audited the safer. As the size of the 
data increases, the time and cost needed for each audit increases, reducing 
their frequency. 
 
Thus techniques that might be adequate at a small scale will break down as the 
scale increases. 
Claims 
How would we know if bit preservation were a solved problem? I suggest that 
proponents of this claim must feel confident that they could, at a minimum, preserve a 
petabyte of data undamaged for a century. Petabyte-scale data collections with long-
term value, such as the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS)4 and the Protein Data Bank5 
already exist, so this is asking them to surmount a rather low bar. How confident 
should proponents feel in their ability to keep a petabyte for a century? I suggest that 
they should have at least a 50% chance of success. Again, this is a rather low bar. 
 
Proponents might bolster their case that these bars can easily be surmounted by 
pointing to claims such as: “ST5800 has a MTTDL (Mean Time To Data Loss) of 2.4 
× 106 years.”6 (Sun Microsystems, 2008), or: “a Pergamum system capable of storing 
1016 bytes of user data [will have] an MTTDL of 1.25 × 107 hours, or about 1,400 
years.” (Storer, Greenan, Miller & Voruganti, 2008). These, and similar claims by 
other vendors, at first glance make it appear that bit preservation is indeed solved. Off-
the-shelf solutions are ready to hand with performance so good that backups and 
checksums are quite superfluous. But do these claims stand up to examination? 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 The Sloan Digital Sky Survey: http://www.sdss.org/ 
5 Worldwide Protein Data Bank (WWPDB): http://www.wwpdb.org/ 
6 Numbers are expressed in powers-of-ten notation to help readers focus on the scale of the problems 
and the extraordinary level of reliability required. 
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Before using Sun’s claim for its ST5800 as an example, I should stipulate that the 
ST5800 is an excellent product. It represents the state of the art in storage technology, 
and Sun’s marketing claims represent the state of the art in storage marketing. 
Nevertheless, Sun does not guarantee that data in the ST5800 will last 2.4 × 106 years. 
Sun’s terms and conditions explicitly disclaim any liability whatsoever for loss of, or 
damage to, the data the ST5800 stores (Sun Microsystems, 2006) whenever it occurs. 
 
All that the claim says is that if you watched a large number of ST5800 systems 
for a long time, recorded the time at which each of them first suffered a data loss, and 
then averaged these times, the result would be 2.4 × 106 years. Suppose Sun watched 
10 ST5800s and noticed that three of them lost data during the first year, four of them 
lost data after 2.4 × 106 years, and the remaining three lost data after 4.8×106 years, 
they would be correct that the MTTDL was 2.4 × 106 years. But we would not consider 
that a system with a 30% chance of data loss in the first year had solved the bit 
preservation problem. A single MTTDL number isn’t a useful characterization of a 
solution. 
 
Consider the slightly more scientific claim made at the recent launch of the 
SC5800 by the marketing department of Sirius Cybernetics7: “SC5800 has a MTTDL 
of (2.4 ± 0.4) × 106 years”. Sirius thus claims that about 2/3 of the failures occurred 
between 2.0×106 and 2.8×106 years after the start of the experiment. They didn’t start 
watching 10 SC5800s 2.8 million years ago. So how would they know? 
 
Perhaps, instead of watching, say ten systems for 2.4×106, years they watched 
more systems for a shorter time. Sirius says they will sell 2×104 SC5800s per year at 
$5×104 each (a billion-a-year business), and they expect the product to be in the 
market for 10 years. The SC5800 has a service life of 10 years. So if Sirius watched 
their entire production of SC5800s ($1010 worth of storage systems) over their entire 
service life the experiment would end 20 years from now after accumulating about 2 × 
106 system-years of data. If their claim is correct they would have about a 17% chance 
of seeing a single data loss event. 
 
In other words, Sirius Cybernetics claims that the probability that no SC5800 will 
ever lose any data is over 80%. Or, since each SC5800 stores 5×1013 bytes, that there 
is an 80% probability that 1019 bytes of data will survive 10 years undamaged. 
 
If one could believe the Sirius Cybernetics claim, the petabyte would look pretty 
safe for a century. But the claim clearly isn’t based on an experiment that won’t 
provide results until 2028 and even when it does will not validate the number in 
question. In fact, numbers like these are not the result of experiment at all. No feasible 
experiment could validate them. They are projections, based on models of how 
components of the system such as disks and software behave. 
 
The state of the art in this kind of modeling is exemplified by the Pergamum 
Project at UC Santa Cruz (Storer et al., 2008). Their model includes disk failures at 
rates derived from (Pinheiro, Weber & Barroso, 2007; Schroeder & Gibson, 2007) and 
sector failures at rates derived from disk vendor specifications. Their system attempts 
                                                          
7 Purveyors of chatty doors, existential elevators and paranoid androids to the nobility and gentry of this 
galaxy (Adams, 1978). 
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to conserve power by spinning the disks down whenever possible; they make an 
allowance for the effect of doing so on disk lifetime but it isn’t clear upon what they 
base this. They report that the simulations were difficult: 
 “This lack of data is due to the extremely high reliability of these 
configurations - the simulator modeled many failures, but so few 
caused data loss that the simulation ran very slowly. This 
behavior is precisely what we want from an archival storage 
system: It can gracefully handle many failure events without 
losing data. Even though we captured fewer data points for the 
triple inter-parity configuration, we believe the reported MTTDL 
is a reasonable approximation.” 
 
Although the Pergamum team’s effort to obtain “a reasonable approximation” to 
the MTTDL of their system is praiseworthy, there are a number of reasons to believe 
that it overestimates the reliability of the system in practice: 
• The model draws its failures from exponential distributions. They thus assume 
that both disk and sector failures are uncorrelated, although all measurements 
of actual failures (Bairavasundaram, Goodson, Schroeder, Arpaci-Dusseau & 
Arpaci-Dusseau, 2008; Talagala, 1999) report significant correlations. 
Correlated failures greatly increase the probability of data loss (Baker et al., 
2006; Elerath & Pecht, 2007); this is the reason RAID systems fail to achieve 
the reliability predicted by the published models, which are based on 
exponential distributions (Patterson et al., 1988). 
• Other than a small reduction in disk lifetime from each power-on event, they 
assume that failure rates observed in always-on disk usage translate to their 
mostly-off environment. A study (Williams, Rosenthal, Roussopoulos & 
Georgis, 2008) published after their paper reports a quantitative accelerated 
life test of data retention in almost-always-off disks. It shows that the 3.5” 
disks anticipated by the Pergamum team have data life dramatically worse in 
this usage mode than 2.5” disks using the same underlying technology. 
• They assume that disk and sector failures are the only failures contributing to 
the system’s failures, although a study (Krioukov et al., 2008) shows that 
other hardware components contribute significantly. 
• They assume that their software is bug-free, despite several studies of file and 
storage implementations (Engler, 2007; Jiang, Hu, Zhou & Kanevsky, 2008; 
Prabhakaran et al., 2005) that uniformly report finding bugs capable of 
causing data loss in all systems studied. 
• They also ignore all other threats to stored data (Rosenthal, Robertson, Lipkis, 
Reich & Morabito, 2005) as possible causes of data loss. Among these threats 
are operator error, insider abuse and external attack. Each of these has been 
the subject of anecdotal reports of actual loss of preserved data. In particular, 
over 20 years at the San Diego Supercomputer Center, operator error is said to 
have been the cause of three-quarters of all data loss incidents (Moore, 2008)  
 
What can models like this tell us? Their results depend on both: 
• the details of the simulation of the system being studied which, one hopes, 
accurately reflect its behavior, and 
• the data used to drive the simulation which, one again hopes, accurately 
reflect the behavior of the system’s components. 
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Under certain conditions, it is reasonable to use these models to compare different 
storage system technologies. The most important condition is that the models of the 
two systems use the same data. A claim that modeling showed system A to be more 
reliable than system B when the data used to model system A had much lower failure 
rates for components such as disk drives would not be credible. 
 
These models may well be the best tools available to evaluate different techniques 
for preventing data loss, but they aren’t adequate to determine whether bit preservation 
is a solved problem. We need to know the maximum rate at which data will be lost. 
The models assume things, such as uncorrelated errors and bug-free software, that all 
experimental studies show are false. The models exclude most of the threats to which 
stored data is subject. And in those cases where similar claims, such as those for disk 
reliability (Schroeder & Gibson, 2007; Pinheiro et al., 2007), have been tested they 
have been shown to be optimistic. It is not reasonable to assume that these factors are 
negligible, nor that they affect all systems equally; the models thus provide an estimate 
of the minimum data loss rate to be expected. 
 
Even if we believed the models, the MTTDL number doesn’t tell us how much 
data was lost in the average data loss event. Is petabyte system A with a MTTDL of 
106 years better than a similar size system B with a MTTDL of 103 years? If the 
average data loss event in system A loses the entire petabyte, where the average data 
loss event in system B loses a kilobyte, it would be easy to argue that system B was 
109 times better. 
 
It is clear that we need a better way to define and measure bit preservation 
performance. Mean time to data loss is not a useful characterization of how well a 
system stores bits through time. 
Theory 
In order to claim that “bit preservation is a solved problem” we would need three 
things we currently don’t have: 
• A specific requirement as to how well bits need to be preserved. 
• A technique for measuring whether actual systems achieve the required level 
of bit preservation. 
• Measurements of an actual system using the technique that confirm it meets 
or exceeds the requirement. 
 
In this section we suggest a metric that would be more useful than MTTDL, and 
ask whether it is possible to characterize actual systems in terms of this metric. 
Defining a Solution 
The most abstract model of a bit preservation system is as a black box, into which 
a string of bits S(0) is placed at time T(0) and from which at subsequent times T(i) a 
string of bits S(i) can be extracted. The system is successful if S(i) = S(0) for all i. 
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No real-world system can be perfect and eternal, so real systems will fail. The 
simplest model of these failures is analogous to the decay of radioactive atoms. Each 
bit in the string independently is subject to a random process that has a constant small 
probability per unit time of causing its value to flip. The time after which there is a 
50% probability that a bit will have flipped is the “bit half-life”. 
 
The requirement of a 50% chance that a petabyte will survive for a century 
translates into a bit half-life of 8 × 1017 years. The current estimate of the age of the 
universe U is 1.4 × 1010 years, so this is a bit half-life approximately 6 × 107U. 
Measuring a Solution 
Because current storage systems are extraordinarily reliable, measuring their bit 
half-life involves observing very large numbers of bits for a very long time. If you 
wanted to take a year to measure whether a system met the petabyte for-a-century 
requirement you might watch a thousand such systems, an exabyte of data. If the 
system were just good enough, you would see a single bit flip in just five of the 
systems. 
 
Even if one were able to afford this experiment, doing so would be challenging. 
Data must be read from the system and compared with their expected value. Even if 
each bit is checked only once at the end of the year, the comparisons have to be 
performed with less than 1 chance in 1019 of any error. 
 
In practice, estimates of bit half-life would have to be based upon the same 
models as estimates of MTTDL, and would thus share many of the same difficulties. 
 
Of course, no-one expects an individual system of hardware and software to last a 
century. Preserved data will be migrated regularly to newer hardware and software. It 
might be thought that a system that migrated data every five years could meet the 
target with one-twentieth the reliability. There are two fallacies in this: 
• The serial migration does not decrease the number of bit-years of exposure to 
risk. 
• The migration process cannot simply be assumed to be error-free. 
 
In the big picture, migration processes are part of the total system whose 
reliability is to be measured. Errors in these processes will also contribute to reducing 
the bit half-life. 
Assessment 
There is no escape from the problem that the size of the data collections to be 
preserved and the times for which they must be preserved mean that experimental 
confirmation that the technology chosen is up to the job is not economically feasible. 
Even if it was, the results would not be available soon enough to be useful. What this 
argument demonstrates is that, far from bit preservation being a solved problem, it is in 
a very specific sense an unsolvable problem. Even if we believed a system we 
developed was reliable enough, there are no feasible experiments that could confirm 
our belief in time to be useful. 
 
Bit half-life is a more informative metric than MTTDL, because it is a measure of 
the reliability of the data, not a measure of the reliability of the system storing it. The 
data’s survival is what we care about. It thus captures the fact that the impact of a data 
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loss event depends not just on when it happens, but also on how much data is lost. It is  
still far from ideal: 
• Bits in real storage systems do not fail independently; they exhibit significant 
correlations in space and time (Bairavasundaram et al., 2008). These 
correlations make failure more likely than it otherwise would be. This 
observation doesn’t invalidate the simple “radioactive decay” model; it 
merely makes adequate bit half-life a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a system to meet the requirement. 
• Like MTTDL, it is a statistical estimate and thus, like MTTDL, it is not useful 
without an uncertainty interval. 
• Because storage systems are so reliable, it is just as difficult to measure bit 
half-life as it is to measure MTTDL. 
Practice 
As enterprises such as Google (Chang et al., 2006) and institutions such as the 
Sloan Digital Sky Survey and the Large Hadron Collider8 collect petabytes of data 
with long-term value that must remain on-line to be useful, questions of the economics 
and reliability of storage systems have become the focus of researchers’ attention. 
Storage Failures 
Papers at the 2007 FAST conference used data from NetApp (Schroeder & 
Gibson, 2007) and Google (Pinheiro et al., 2007) to study disk replacement rates in 
large storage farms. They showed that the manufacturer’s MTTF numbers were 
optimistic. Subsequent analysis of the NetApp data (Jiang et al., 2008) showed that all 
other components contributed to the storage system failures, and: 
‘Interestingly, [the earlier studies] found disks are replaced much 
more frequently (2-4 times) than vendor-specified [replacement 
rates]. But as this study indicates, there are other storage 
subsystem failures besides disk failures that are treated as disk 
faults and lead to unnecessary disk replacements.” 
 
Two studies, one at CERN (Kelemen, 2007) and one using data from NetApp 
(Bairavasundaram et al, 2008), greatly improved on earlier work using data from the 
Internet Archive (Baker et al., 2006; Schwarz et al., 2006).They studied silent data 
corruption in state-of-the-art storage systems; events in which the content of a file in 
storage changes with no explanation or recorded errors. 
 
The NetApp study looked at the incidence of silent storage corruption in 
individual disks in RAID arrays. The data was collected over 41 months from 
NetApp’s filers in the field, covering over 1.5 × 106 drives. They found over 4 × 105 
silent corruption incidents. More than 3 × 104 of them were not detected until RAID 
restoration and could thus have caused data loss despite the replication and auditing 
provided by NetApp’s row-diagonal parity RAID (Corbett et al., 2004). 
 
The CERN study used a program that wrote large files into CERN’s various data 
stores, which represent a broad range of state-of-the-art enterprise storage systems 
(mostly RAID arrays), and checked them over a period of six months. A total of about 
9.7 × 1016 bytes was written and about 1.92 × 108 bytes was found to have suffered 
                                                          
8 CERN, Worldwide LHC Computing Grid: http://lcg.web.cern.ch/LCG/ 
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silent corruption, of which about 2/3 was persistent; re-reading did not return good 
data. In other words, about 1.2 × 10−9 of the data written to CERN’s storage was 
permanently corrupted within six months. We can place an upper bound on the bit 
half-life in this sample of current storage systems by assuming that the data was 
written instantly at the start of the six months and checked instantly at the end; the 
result is 2×108 or about 10−2U. Thus to reach the petabyte for a century requirement 
we would need to improve the performance of current enterprise storage systems by a 
factor of at least 109. Readers interested in some of the varied and complex causes of 
silent data corruption are referred to (Elerath, 2009) on disk technology and 
(Bairavasundaram et al., 2008) on other storage system components. 
Surviving Storage Failures 
Despite the manufacturer’s claims, current research shows that state-of-the-art 
storage systems fall so many orders of magnitude below our bit preservation 
requirements that we cannot expect even dramatic improvements in technology to fill 
the gap. Maintaining a single replica in a single storage system is not an adequate 
solution to the bit preservation problem. 
 
Practical digital preservation systems must therefore: 
• Maintain more than one copy by replicating their data on multiple, ideally 
different, storage systems. 
• Audit or (scrub) the replicas to detect damage, and repair them by overwriting 
the known-bad copy with data from another. 
 
The more replicas and the more frequently they are audited and repaired the 
longer the bit half-life we can expect. This is, after all, the basis for the backups and 
checksums technique in common use. In fact, current storage systems already use 
versions of these techniques, for example in the form of RAID (Patterson, Gibson & 
Katz, 1988). Despite this, the bit half-life they deliver is inadequate. Unfortunately, 
adding the necessary inter-storage-system replication and scrubbing is expensive. 
 
2007 cost figures from the San Diego Supercomputer Center (Moore et al., 2007) 
show that maintaining a single on-line copy of a petabyte for a year then cost about 
$1.5 × 106. A single near-line copy on tape cost about $5 × 105 a year9. These costs 
decrease with time, albeit not as fast as raw disk costs. The British Library estimates a 
30% per annum decrease. Assuming that this rate continues for at least a decade, if you 
can afford about 3.3 times the first year’s cost to store an extra replica for a decade, 
you can afford to store it indefinitely. So, adding a second replica of a petabyte on disk 
would cost about $3.5 × 106 and on tape would cost about $1.4 × 106. Adding cost to a 
preservation effort to increase reliability in this way is a two-edged sword; doing so 
necessarily increases the risk that preservation will fail for economic reasons. 
 
Disk storage has a long history of rapid decline (Christensen, 1997). It is tempting 
to assume that, as time goes by, it will be economically feasible to add more replicas of 
given content, and that doing so in effect reduces the problem of a petabyte-for-a-
century to a petabyte-for-a-decade. There are three flaws in this argument: 
                                                          
9 SDSC reports that the 2008 costs are $1.05 × 106 and $4.2 × 105 
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• It ignores the fact that raw media cost, which has decreased rapidly, is a 
minority of the total cost of storage (Moore et al., 2007). The other factors 
have not decreased exponentially with time. 
• It ignores the fact that, just as storage cost per byte has dropped exponentially, 
the amount of data to be stored has grown exponentially. 
• A senior disk drive engineer recently pointed out that although the technology 
for ever larger consumer 3.5” disk drives is available, the business case for 
them has collapsed (Anderson, 2009). This makes it likely that in the near 
future the exponential drop in the cost of large-scale disk storage will cease, at 
least for a few years. 
 
If the cost-per-byte curve stays flat, even for a few years in the face of exponential 
growth in storage, demand the result will be a crisis in preservation economics. 
 
Further, without detailed understanding of the rates at which different 
mechanisms cause loss and damage, it isn’t possible to derive from a desired bit half-
life the appropriate number of replicas10 and thus the cost implication of replication. 
At small scales the response to this uncertainty is to add more replicas, but as the sca
increases this rapidly becomes unaffordable. 
le 
 
Replicating among identical systems is much less effective than replicating among 
diverse systems. Identical systems are subject to common mode failures, for example 
caused by a software bug in all the systems damaging the same data in each. On the 
other hand, purchasing and operating a number of identical systems will be 
considerably cheaper than operating a set of diverse systems. 
 
Each replica is vulnerable to loss and damage. Unless they are regularly audited 
they contribute little to increasing bit half-life. The bandwidth and processing capacity 
needed to scrub the data are both costly; adding these costs increases the risk of failure. 
Custom hardware (Michail, Kakarountas, Theodoridis & Goutis, 2005) could compute 
the SHA-1 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 1995) checksum 
of a petabyte of data in a month, but doing so requires impressive bandwith - the 
equivalent of three gigabit Ethernet interfaces running at full speed the entire month. 
User access to data in preservation systems is typically infrequent; they are therefore 
rarely designed to provide such high-bandwidth read access. System cost increases 
rapidly with I/O bandwidth, and the additional accesses to the data (whether on disk or 
on tape) needed for scrubbing themselves potentially increase the risk of failure. 
 
The point of writing software that reads and verifies stored data in this way is to 
detect damage and exploit replication to repair it, thereby increasing bit half-life. How 
well can we do this? RAID is an example of a software technique of this type applied 
to disks. In practice, the CERN study (Kelemen, 2007) looking at real RAID systems 
from the outside showed a significant rate of silent data corruption, and the NetApp 
study (Bairavasundaram et al., 2008) looking at them from the inside showed a 
significant rate of silent disk errors that would lead to silent data corruption. A study 
(Krioukov et al., 2008) of the full range of current algorithms used to implement RAID 
                                                          
10 The number can be quite large; a study of paper journals (Yano, 2008) found between 3 and 31 copies 
were needed to achieve loss probabilities over a century of between 10−3 and 10−6 given various 
plausible loss rates of the individual copies. The lower repairability of paper copies inflates these 
numbers, while their greater durability deflates them, as against digital copies. 
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found flaws leading to potential data loss in all of them. Both this study, and another 
from IBM (Hafner, Deenadhayalan, Belluomini & Rao, 2008), propose improvements 
to these algorithms but neither claim that they can eliminate silent corruption, or even 
accurately predict its incidence: 
“while we attempt to use as realistic probability numbers as 
possible, the goal is not to provide precise data loss probabilities, 
but to illustrate the advantage of using a model checker, and 
discuss potential trade-offs between different protection 
schemes.” (Krioukov et al., 2008) 
 
Thus although replication and scrubbing are capable of decreasing the incidence 
of data loss in current storage systems, they cannot eliminate it completely. And the 
replication and scrubbing software itself will contain bugs that can cause data loss. It 
must be doubtful that we can implement these techniques well enough to increase the 
bit half-life of systems with an affordable number of replicas by 109. 
 
It takes experiments with petabytes of storage to characterize the performance of 
current systems accurately. Even if we believed we had implemented replication and 
audit well enough to improve performance by 109, we could not afford to do the 
experiments that would be needed to confirm it. 
Policy 
If bit preservation were a solved problem then it would be reasonable to expect 
that no bits would be lost. This is not the case; just as in paper archives, preserved 
content in digital archives will be lost or damaged. Setting unreasonable expectations 
for the performance of our preservation systems, for example by continually making 
unsupported claims to have solved the bit preservation problem, is simply setting 
ourselves up to be perceived as failures. 
 
If preserved bits will be lost, the question becomes how to invest the limited funds 
available to reduce the rate of loss as much as possible. It is a commonplace that if you 
can measure something you can improve it. The history of technology markets such as 
CPUs and graphics chips show that competition between vendors based on widely 
accepted standard benchmarks can drive rapid improvements in component cost-
performance. Alas, although raw storage cost is easily measured and is the subject of 
effective competition to decrease cost per byte (Christensen, 1997), long-term storage 
reliability is very hard to measure and the accepted metric for it is not very 
informative. Competition to reduce the cost of a given level of bit preservation is 
therefore much less effective. 
 
It is in the interest of the digital preservation community to improve competition 
in their market. How could this be done? 
• Agreement on a metric for bit preservation performance is an essential first 
step. It would be extremely valuable if it were possible to define one that was 
easily measureable, but this seems rather unlikely. 
• Given this, it seems likely that numbers for bit preservation performance will 
continue to be generated by models. Achieving consensus on modeling 
techniques is important, especially as it appears that traditional techniques are 
running into difficulties (Elerath & Pecht, 2007; Storer et al., 2008). 
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• These models will need agreed data. Better and more widely available data 
about the real world performance storage components are thus important. 
Realistic studies have only begun to be published, and they aren’t yet based 
on shared metrics. The effort by Usenix and Carnegie-Mellon)11 to establish a 
repository for suitably anonymized data of this kind is to be commended. 
• Storage systems are currently designed using completely inadequate models 
of how components fail. One problem is that these failures are highly 
correlated, making the models complex and difficult. A shared model of the 
threats against which bits need to be preserved, models of these threats, and 
data regarding their incidence is also important. 
• Anecdotal evidence suggests that operator error and insider abuse are major 
causes of data loss in large storage farms; they are difficult to model or 
characterize. This is in part because sites are very reluctant to admit to data 
loss incidents. An anonymous incident reporting system modeled on NASA’s 
Aviation Safety Reporting Conclusions System12 would be very valuable in 
understanding the mechanisms of, and defending against, these failures. 
 
The fact that it is possible for digital information to be copied perfectly does not 
mean that it always will be. While perfection is not within the grasp of real-world 
engineers, improvement is always possible. However, improvement takes money, and 
without the research outlined above we are unable to make rational trade-offs between 
the cost of preserving content to a given level of reliability and the cost of the losses 
implied by the given level. 
Conclusions 
As we have seen, the case that bit preservation is a solved problem rests on the 
conviction that the conventional techniques of backups and checksums are more than 
adequate to the scale of the problem. This conviction is odd. Press accounts (e.g., 
Brodkin, 2008) of companies, presumably using the conventional techniques, 
nevertheless losing essential data are common. Awareness that systems frequently 
encounter scaling problems is also widespread, as is the expectation that the future 
demands for preserving digital content will be enormous. 
 
But the case for bit preservation not being solved does not rest on this cognitive 
dissonance. It rests rather on the many orders of magnitude mismatch between the 
reliability requirements implied by society’s expectations of the amount of data to be 
preserved and the length of time for which it should be preserved, and the observed 
performance of current storage hardware and software. 
 
Were every bit to come adequately endowed with capital to provide guaranteed 
funds through time its preservation would not be a major concern, although it would 
still not be a solved problem. Like almost all engineering problems, bit preservation is 
fundamentally a question of budgets. Society’s ever-increasing demands for vast 
amounts of data to be kept for the future are not matched by suitably lavish funds. 
Thus, absent a technological miracle, bit preservation is a problem with which we are 
doomed to struggle indefinitely. 
                                                          
11 Usenix, the computer failure data repository (CFDR): http://cfdr.usenix.org/ 
12 NASA. Aviation Safety Reporting System: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/ 
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